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Abstract 
 
  
Differences in corruption perception across the countries of Europe are 
marked and persistent over time. This study seeks to explain these 
differences in the countries of both the European Union and the European 
Free Trade Association during 2007–2017. The core hypothesis is that the 
style of government intervention in the economy –rather than the size of 
government– is the main explanatory factor for the differences. To test this 
hypothesis, the empirical analysis disentangles the effects of the two main 
government tools for intervention in the economy: taxation and regulation. 
The main result is that the fiscal burden does not consistently present a 
significant relationship with corruption. In contrast, the regulatory burden 
associated with excessive red tape is a strong driver of corruption, because 
a consistent and significant positive association is found. Furthermore, 
differences in legal origins, history, democratic experience and several 
economic factors contribute to explaining differences between European 
countries. 
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Introduction 
Corruption negatively affects investment and growth (Mauro, 1995; Beekman, Bulte and 
Nillesen, 2014). In its political variety, corruption has been defined as “the abuse of entrusted 
power by political leaders for private gain” (Transparency International, 2004: 1). Based on this 
definition, it is perhaps only natural to draw a relationship between corruption and government 
size, simply because an increase in the latter provides more opportunities for bureaucrats and 
politicians to engage in activities with a potential for corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In a 
similar vein, both Tanzi (1997) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) confirm that the larger the 
government the greater the likelihood of corruption, while Goel and Nelson (1998) report that 
the size of the state and local government has a direct association with corruption in the United 
States. Similarly, Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2007) and Buehn and Schneider 
(2012) find that government size is positively related to corruption; however, the results in 
Treisman (2000) point to contradictory outcomes in this regard.  
Government size is a relative term and it is frequent in the literature to use a fiscal measure 
[though see Buehn and Schneider (2012) for an exception]. However, taxation is just one of the 
tools available to governments to intervene in the economy and it does not, in itself, define the 
overall size of government. For this reason, the relationship between corruption and 
government size as reported in earlier studies might be misleading, given that fiscal size does 
not necessarily influence – as Alesina and Angeletos (2005) also point out – the level of 
corruption. A similar conclusion is drawn by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) who claim that the 
Nordic countries, with their low levels of corruption and high levels of public spending and 
fiscal government intervention (compared not only with countries worldwide, but also with 
other European countries), obviously contradict this belief. 
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The focus of this study is to account for the remarkable differences in corruption perception 
across the countries of Europe. The core hypothesis is that –rather than the size of government– 
the style of government intervention in the economy is the main explanatory factor for these 
differences. To test this hypothesis, the analysis distinguishes between the effect of the two 
main tools for government intervention in the economy: taxation (fiscal burden) and regulation 
(regulatory burden).  
It is my contention that the regulatory burden is a major trigger of corruption. In other words, 
the heavier the regulatory burden, the more and bigger are the opportunities for corruption or 
related activities, thus increasing the presence of corruption. In this regard, this analysis echoes 
Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1997) hypothesis that contractual government intervention (or 
“private management under contractual regulation” as they described it) has a stronger effect 
on corruption than does direct government activity (or, again to use their terms, “public 
management”). Hence, this study also contributes to the existing literature by providing an 
analysis of the effects of the regulatory burden on corruption.  
The research reported here was conducted on both the European Union (EU) and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries in the period 2007–2017. Obtaining precise data on 
corruption is difficult, the reason for this being obvious: those involved in corruption naturally 
seek to hide its presence. For this reason, developing a reliable corruption index has attracted 
much scholarly attention. Indeed, in the literature, corruption is most usually measured by 
applying a corruption index developed by a reputable organization. For example, among the 
most widely used indexes we find the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by 
Transparency International, and those included in the Global Competitiveness Reports of the 
World Economic Forum. The latter are based on surveys questioning business executives and 
experts about their perceptions of corruption.  
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For this study, I have opted for the index developed each year by the World Economic Forum, 
the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); however, it is worth stressing that for the period under 
analysis, 2007–2017, corruption perception as measured by the GCI and the CPI presented a 
correlation of 0.954 (p<0.000). For my purposes here, the GCI also provides a measure of 
regulatory burden within a country (captured as “Burden of government regulation”), which I 
use as a key explanatory variable. This means that the data for the dependent variable and the 
data for the key explanatory variable are homogeneous, being obtained from the same source 
and using the same methodology.  
The empirical analysis allows the effects of taxation and regulation to be disentangled. The 
study’s main result is that the fiscal burden does not present any significant relationship with 
corruption and, therefore, it does not contribute to explaining the differences in corruption 
between the European countries. In contrast, the regulatory burden appears to be a strong driver 
of corruption, because a consistent and significant positive association between corruption and 
regulation is found. Furthermore, differences in legal origins, consolidation of democracy, 
openness of the economy, and education contribute to explaining differences in this regard 
between European countries. 
Factors affecting corruption: Background and hypotheses  
The literature has considered many factors as potential drivers of corruption. Treisman (2007) 
is particularly comprehensive, as it considers factors related to colonial history, religion, ethnic 
divisions, socioeconomic characteristics, institutions, and government. The empirical analysis 
described below includes the countries of the EU and the EFTA; hence, it deals with a relatively 
homogeneous area in terms of history, religion, and ethnicity. For this reason, the focus is 
placed first on institutional factors. Later, attention switches to government intervention in the 
economy and, particularly, regulation. Finally, economic and social factors are considered. 
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Institutions and democracy  
Institutional factors are perhaps the most important determinants to consider when seeking to 
explain what triggers (or prevents) corruption. In recent decades, a notable body of research has 
been built up suggesting that a country’s administrative traditions or legal origins are strongly 
correlated with its economic outcomes as well as its legal rules and regulations. Painter and 
Peters (2010) distinguish between four Western administrative traditions: Anglo-Saxon Law 
(Common Law), Napoleonic or French Law (Civil Law), German Law and Scandinavian Law. 
Dominant state traditions are defined mainly by the relationship between the state and civil 
society (Painter and Peters, 2010). In this regard, the pluralist Anglo-Saxon tradition contrasts 
markedly with the heavily hierarchical, interventionist Napoleonic tradition. Both German and 
Scandinavian traditions are characterized as being organicist, with an emphasis on open 
government in the case of Scandinavian Law (Painter and Peters, 2010). These differences in 
interventionism and discretionary power could well have an impact on corruption. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) adopt a broad view of legal origin as a means of socially 
controlling economic life, in what they refer to as their Legal Origin Theory. In their empirical 
analysis these authors find Anglo-Saxon common Law to be associated with lower levels of 
corruption than those associated with French civil law. 
Still within the domain of historical legacies, the potential influence of having a colonial history 
on differences in corruption has recently been stressed (i.e. Treisman, 2007), after first being 
mooted in papers by Lambsdorff (1999) and Leite and Weidmann (1999). Indeed, the influence 
of colonial history was empirically analysed in Treisman (2000), who found it to be significant. 
The hypothesis that democracy contributes to reducing corruption has been frequently tested in 
empirical analyses. Typically, it is concluded that it has a negative effect (that is, it reduces) 
corruption perception (Treisman, 2000, 2007; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Mohtadi and Roe, 
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2003; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013). However, the relationship would seem to be far from 
linear (Montinola and Jackman, 2002). In cases where there is a weakening in extreme 
autocracies or where political freedoms are gained, perceived corruption seems to decrease. 
However, in cases of imperfect democracies, small increases in freedom do not seem to have a 
direct impact on corruption perception. Overall, most of the available evidence indicates that 
long-established democracies present lower levels of corruption than those presented by young 
democracies or authoritarian regimes (Treisman, 2007; Mohtadi and Roe, 2003; Kalenborn and 
Lessmann, 2013).  
Thus, with respect to institutions and democracy, I formulate the following hypotheses:  
H1: A French legal origin (Civil law) is associated with greater corruption 
H2: Having a colonial history is associated with greater corruption  
H3: Senior democracies present lower levels of corruption  
Government intervention 
Government size has been positively associated with corruption for some time, because, as 
mentioned in the introduction, an increase in government size provides more opportunities for 
bureaucrats and politicians to engage in activities with a potential for corruption (Tanzi, 1997; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Empirical analyses reported by Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2007) and Buehn and Schneider (2012) found government size 
to be positively related to corruption, but Treisman (2000) presented contradictory findings. 
More specifically, Goel and Nelson (1998) and Buehn and Schnedier (2012) found a positive 
association between fiscal pressure and corruption while lower fiscal freedom increased 
corruption. In contrast, McGee (2008) and Dreher and Schneider (2010) found fiscal pressure 
to be negatively associated with corruption. Overall, the findings in the literature regarding the 
effect of taxation and fiscal pressure on corruption are diverse and contradictory.  
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Although scarcer than the research on fiscal pressure and corruption, research on the effect of 
the regulatory burden on corruption has tended to reach more of a consensus, frequently finding 
a positive relationship between the regulatory burden and corruption. Djankov et al. (2002) 
investigated the number of procedures an entrepreneur must face before they can operate a 
business legally and the effect this has on corruption. The authors found that countries in which 
the number of procedures was greater experienced more corruption. In another interesting 
study, Fazekas (2017) analyses the effect of different types of regulations on bribery and 
government favouritism. He finds that the effect of different types of regulations is context-
dependent and suggests stronger potential to reduce corruption by decreasing regulations 
related to day-to-day business-state interaction, contract enforcement, and registering property. 
Another study that specifically relates regulation and corruption is Holcombe and Boudreaux 
(2015), who seek to explain why Scandinavian countries present lower levels of corruption 
despite their having relatively large governments, when measured in fiscal terms. They run a 
cross-sectional analysis on a worldwide sample of countries and find that while government 
expenditure has a weak association with corruption, regulation has a strong positive effect. This 
would appear to explain the Scandinavian paradox.  
When analysing the potential effect of regulation on corruption, we need to be aware of the 
potential endogeneity in the relationship. Knack and Keefer (1995) suggest that countries that 
allow public officials to demand large and arbitrary bribes also inhibit those officials from 
credibly following through their future commitments, which in turn shapes the characteristics 
of inefficient regulation. Further, Krueger (1993) argues that corrupt bureaucrats will 
intentionally introduce new regulations and red tape, to be able to extract more bribes by 
threatening to deny permits. Hence, it may well be that it is in fact corruption that promotes 
regulation, which is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) view that many regulations 
exist because they provide the opportunity for officials to obtain benefits from their 
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discretionary power. This issue is specifically addressed below, when implementing the 
empirical strategy. 
Regarding the style of government intervention, I formulate the following hypotheses: 
H4: The regulatory burden on an economy increases corruption 
H5: The fiscal burden does not have a significant relationship with corruption 
Economic and social factors 
Several studies have examined the effect of the shadow economy on corruption (Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2009; Buehn and Schneider, 2012), using unemployment as 
one of the main indicators of this informal economy. Other papers have focused on the direct 
effect of unemployment on corruption. Most studies find that unemployment reinforces 
corruption (Saha, Gounder, and Su; 2009; Peña-Miguel and Cuadrado-Ballesteros 2019), 
although Saha and Su (2012) do not find a direct relationship between the two.  
The relationship between trade openness and corruption was first tested by Krueger (1974), 
who reports that trade restrictions divert resources from productive activities to corruption and 
other forms of rent seeking. Ades and Di Tella, (1999), however, suggest a more ambiguous 
theoretical relationship between trade and corruption. Trade restrictions reduce market 
competition and generate extra rents, thus triggering corruption. Yet, lower levels of 
competition increase the value of corruption avoidance and, as a result, trade restrictions may 
reduce corruption. Indeed, the authors’ empirical analysis supports the insight that trade 
openness reduces corruption. The same outcome is reported by Sachs et al (1995), Ades and Di 
Tella (1997), Treisman (2000), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Gatti (2004), whereas Torrez 
(2002) and Majeed (2014) find more mixed results. 
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Individuals with a lower level of education tend to have more difficulties in understanding 
public policies and the workings of government (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In contrast, citizens 
in countries with higher levels of educational attainment are better able to identify practices that 
undermine the correct functioning of institutions, such as corruption, and are less tolerant of 
them (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). An influential study examining the effect of education 
on corruption is that undertaken by Glaeser and Saks (2006), who analyze the drivers of 
corruption in the United States and find education to be negatively associated with corruption. 
Most subsequent studies also find a negative effect of education on corruption (e.g. Truex, 
2011; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2015, Peña-Miguel and Cuadrado-Ballesteros 2019). 
However, Buehn and Schneider (2012) fail to find a significant relationship between the two.  
Finally, we turn to the relationship between economic development and corruption. The 
negative effect of economic development on corruption perceptions has long been reported (La 
Porta et al.; 1999, Treisman, 2000; Holcombe and Boudreaux, 2015). In fact, Treisman (2007, 
p. 223) considers this association as “[by] far the strongest and most consistent finding of the 
new empirical work”. Hence, I formulate the following hypotheses: 
H6: Unemployment is positively related to corruption.  
H7: The level of economic openness is negatively related to corruption. 
H8: The level of educational attainment is negatively related to corruption. 
H9: Economic development is negatively related to corruption. 
Corruption in European countries 
A sizeable majority of Europeans believe corruption to be a major problem within their country, 
as indicated by various Eurobarometer Surveys published since 2005 (see Figure 1, and map 
1), although there is considerable divergence across the countries of the EU. Data from the 2017 
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Eurobarometer Survey (European Commission, 2017) seems to adhere to a two-out-of-three 
rule: thus, two out of three of the population in EU countries believe corruption to be a 
widespread problem, while in two out of three of all EU countries, two out of every three 
citizens or more believe corruption to be a major problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: Perception of corruption as a major problem in own country, 2017 
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Figure 1. % of population that believes that corruption is a major problem in own 
country. 2017
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This high perception of corruption is persistent over time: between 2005, when the first 
Eurobarometer Survey was conducted, and 2017, the overall perception within the EU has 
fallen just four percentage points (p.p.) from 72 to 68% (or 67%, if we exclude from the 2017 
figures the three countries not included in the 2005 Survey, that is, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Croatia). Figure 2, however, shows the diversity in changing perceptions across the EU, from 
a 21 p.p. increase in Spain to a 30 p.p. decrease in Poland. Yet no clear pattern (either regional 
or economic-related) emerges from these data about these shifting perceptions of corruption, 
besides the fact that perception of corruption tended to increase in Southern countries (see map 
2) 
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Map 2: Change in perception of corruption as a major problem in own country, 2005-2017 
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Figure 2. Change in perception of corrution of major problem in the country (2005-2017)
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Parallel to concerns with corruption in the institutional arena, scholarly research has paid 
increasing attention to other manifestations of corruption, identified as constituting a problem 
in most EU countries (Charron, 2016). For example, Kartal (2014) finds that while in the pre-
accession period (pre-candidacy) incentives from the EU institutions contributed to controlling 
corruption among East European candidates, following accession this control over corruption 
was weakened. Yet, recent research by Elbasani and Šelo Šabić (2018) challenges the fact that 
pre-accession efforts were successful in controlling corruption in the cases of Croatia and 
Albania. Elsewhere, Peña-Miguel and Cuadrado-Ballesteros (2019) analyse the effects of 
privatization on corruption perception (for outcomes see below), while Pellegata and Memoli 
(2016) find a negative effect of corruption on confidence in political institutions across the EU. 
In a further examination of institutional confidence, Bauhr and Charron (2019) find that support 
for within EU-redistribution policies is contingent upon perceptions of corruption. Thus, 
corruption perception in countries in which the quality of government is low tends to increase 
support for within-EU redistribution policies, but the contrary occurs in contexts where the 
quality of governmental institutions is high.     
While factors related to perceptions of corruption have been empirically analysed for different 
countries, regions, and local jurisdictions (see, for instance, Bauhr and Charron, 2019; Bauhr, 
Charron, and Wängnerud, 2019), to the best of my knowledge, only one unpublished paper, 
MacDonald and Majeed (2011), has attempted to explain differences in the causes of corruption 
across Europe using cross-country data and multivariate techniques. MacDonald and Majeed 
(2011) draw on data from the corruption perception index published by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for five-year average periods between 1984 and 2007 for the EU-
25 Member States. They analyse the potential effect of several factors, using aggregate 
indicators obtained mainly from the ICRG, and find that rule of law, economic development, 
and government size (measured in terms of government expenditure) reduce corruption. A not 
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dissimilar study was conducted by Peña-Miguel and Cuadrado-Ballesteros (2019) in their 
examination of the relationship between privatization and corruption. The authors use as their 
controls a set of economic variables similar to the ones used herein and find corruption to be 
positively associated with unemployment and foreign trade, and negatively related to education 
and economic development. 
The empirical strategy deployed in the following sections is closely connected to that adopted 
by MacDonald and Majeed (2011). Here, however, I further contribute to the literature by using 
full annual data sets for the period 2007–2017 for all EU-28 Member States plus three EFTA 
members (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland). This results in a database with 431 observations, 
four times the size of that employed by MacDonald and Majeed (2011). Additionally, I use a 
variety of specifications for institutional, social and economic variables, and disentangle the 
effect of government intervention by distinguishing between fiscal and regulatory pressures.  
Data and methods 
Data 
To undertake this research a database was first built for the EU-28 Member States plus Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland. All data were obtained from publicly available sources. Among these, 
particular mention should be given to information contained in the Global Competitiveness 
Report (World Economic Forum) –henceforth the GCR– from which data on corruption 
perception and regulatory burden were obtained for all countries. The database begins in 2007 
for two reasons: First and most importantly, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU 
in that year virtually completed the expansion of the Union to the countries of Eastern European 
(the accession of Croatia in 2013 poses no problem as data are available for this country as far 
back as 2007); and, second, 2006 is the first year for which a wholly comparable GCR was 
published. This is important because in order to control for endogeneity our generalized method 
of moments (GMM) model includes a lag variable for the corruption index (see below for 
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detailed explanation) and had 2006 been used as our cut-off point it would not have been 
possible to include this lag.       
Data for most of the economic and social variables were obtained from Eurostat. Data about 
the openness of the economy were obtained from the OECD and World Bank national accounts. 
Data on institutional and democracy-related variables were obtained from the dataset in La 
Porta et al. (2008), the Special Committee on Decolonization (United Nations), and the 
individual countries’ institutional web pages.  
Variables 
The dependent variable is the Corruption_Index (CI) included as indicator 1.05 in the GCR, 
capturing perceptions with regard to irregular payments and bribes.1 Given the way in which 
the scale is constructed in the Report and in order to facilitate direct interpretation, the index is 
reversed here multiplying by (-1).   
Indexes based on opinion surveys are open to criticism on the grounds that they may be affected 
by the media, anticorruption campaigns or politically motivated accusations. Lambsdorff 
(2004) discusses the relative strengths and shortcomings of such perception indexes but stresses 
the lack of alternatives. Certainly, perceived corruption has its flaws and potential biases; 
nonetheless, perception indexes present a high degree of inter-correlation, suggesting that 
despite differences in their respective methodologies, they have a common output, that is, 
corruption. Indeed, the high correlation between different indexes is indicative of their 
consistency. In this case, and as mentioned earlier, a correlation of 0.95 is found between the 
GCR indexes and the CPI published by Transparency International for the period 2007–2017. 
                                                            
1 The GCR is compiled from a survey conducted among business executives and experts. The indicator 
is an average score across the five components of the following question: “In your country, how common 
is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (a) imports and exports; 
(b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining 
favorable judicial decisions? In each case, the answer ranges from 1 [very common] to 7 [never occurs]”. 
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Furthermore, a correlation of 0.87 was found between GCR data for 2017 and corruption 
perception as measured in the Eurobarometer (2017).  
Additional support is obtained here from the fact we include EU and EFTA countries in our 
observation group, since, to a certain degree, this controls for major cultural differences, 
providing us with relatively homogenous data compared to that used in worldwide studies. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Charron’s (2016) study, conducted in EU countries, finds 
that the corruption perceptions of citizens that have personally experienced public sector 
corruption and those who have not are similar. Likewise, Charron found considerable 
consistency between citizen and expert assessments of corruption. Hence, Charron (2016, p. 
167) claims that “little evidence is found in support of critics’ claims that corruption perceptions 
are driven by outside noise, at least in the sample European countries and regions”. 
The first set of explanatory variables comprises institutional and democracy-related variables. 
First, I include variables capturing Legal_origin (i.e. the four Western administrative 
traditions): Civil_Law, Common_Law, German_Law and Scandinavian_Law (Painter and 
Peters, 2010). Similarly, and in relation to historical legacy, I include the variable 
Colonial_History, capturing the EU states that were former colonies and which won 
independence after World War II (i.e. Cyprus and Malta).  
In the case of democracy-related variables, I first include the variable Senior_Democracies, a 
dummy variable that differentiates between (1) countries with democratic regimes before the 
breakdown and dissolution of the Soviet Union and those that accessed democracy later. As 
time-invariant variables cannot be included in several sets of the estimations, I later consider 
the variable Years_Democracy, measuring the number of years of uninterrupted democratic 
regime after World War II [which resembles Treisman’s (2007) decision to consider democratic 
regimes since 1950]. The relationship between democracy and corruption is not linear 
16 
 
(Montinola and Jackman, 2002). Given the distribution of Years_Democracy, this variable is 
transformed to its logarithmic form, to bring it closer to a normal distribution. 
Next, we consider variables of government intervention. Here, I first include 
Regulatory_Burden, which measures the burden of compliance faced by companies as they 
adhere to the requisite procedures of the public administration, that is, the burden of red tape.2 
As with the Corruption_Index, the index is reversed (multiplied by -1) to facilitate direct 
interpretation. Additionally, the variable Fiscal_Pressure measures total government revenues 
as a percentage of GDP.  
Finally, I include several economic and social variables. Unemployment is the rate of 
unemployment; Openness measures the weight of foreign trade in GDP; Education captures the 
percentage of population (active, 16-64 years) with tertiary education (levels 5 to 8 Eurostat); 
and GDPpc_ppp captures the gross domestic product per capita (purchasing power parity 
adjusted). Table 1 summarizes the information on these variables, their sources, and 
expectations. 
Methodology 
I use a panel dataset for the period 2007–2017 to analyse the relationship between corruption 
perception and a set of explanatory variables. The panel data model is specified as follows, 
where sub-indices i and t represent country and year, respectively: 
Corruption_Indexit = βo + β1Legal_origin it + β2Colonial_Historyit + β3Senior_Democracyit + 
β4Regulatory_Burdenit + β5Fiscal_Burdenit + β6Unemploymentit + β7Opennessit + β8Educationit + 
β9GDPpc_pppit+ eit                        (1) 
                                                            
2 This indicator, code 1.09 in the GCR-WEF, is obtained from the answer to the question “In your 
country, how burdensome is it for companies to comply with public administration’s requirements (e.g., 
permits, regulations, reporting)? [1 = extremely burdensome; 7 = not burdensome at all]”. This question 
measures the incidence of red tape: that is, official rules and processes that seem unnecessary and delay 
results, thus exerting a significant and unjustified compliance burden (Moynihan and Herd, 2000), no 
matter whether they pursue legitimate objectives (Herd and Moynihan, 2018, p. 18). Note that Bozeman 
and Feeney (2011) would exclude from such procedures those related to socially desirable objectives.  
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All variables are described in Table 1 and eit is the error term. For Legal_origin, I include 
Common_Law, German_Law and Scandinavian_Law (with Civil_Law as the reference 
category). Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. The correlation matrix is available in Table 
A1, in the appendix. 
 
 
Table 1. Variables, data, sources and expectations 
Variable Measure Source Expected effect on 
corruption perception 
Dependent  
Corruption_Index Corruption Perception GCR-WEF (Code 
#1.05) 
 
Independent  
Civil_Law Civil Law Origin  
Data Set La Porta et al 
(2008) 
 
H1: Civil Law (French 
legal origin) is 
associated with higher 
corruption 
Common_Law Common Law Origin 
German_Law German Law Origin 
Scandinavian_Law Scandinavian Law Origin 
Colonial_History Post WW decolonized states UN Special Committee 
on Decolonization 
H2: Positive 
Senior_Democracy Democratic System before the fall 
of the Soviet Union 
Countries’ institutional 
data sources  
H3: Negative 
Years_Democracy Years of uninterrupted democratic 
regime after world war II. 
Countries’ institutional 
data sources 
H3: Negative 
Regulatory_Burden Burden of the regulatory system 
 
GCR-WEF (code 
#1.09) 
H4: Positive 
Fiscal_Burden Total general government revenue 
as a % of GDP 
Eurostat H5: Uncertain 
Unemployment  Rate of unemployment  Eurostat H6: Positive 
Openness Imports + exports combined as a 
% of GDP 
World Bank and OECD 
National Accounts 
H7: Negative 
Education % population with tertiary 
education (levels 5-8) 
Eurostat H8: Negative 
GDPpc_ppp Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(ppp adjusted) 
Eurostat 
 
H9: Negative 
Source: Author 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
    
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Corruption_Index 341 -4.305 1.215 -6.379 -2.205 
 legor_fr 341 0.355 0.479 0 1 
 legor_uk 341 0.097 0.296 0 1 
 legor_ge 341 0.387 0.488 0 1 
 legor_sc 341 0.161 0.368 0 1 
 Colonial_History 341 0.065 0.246 0 1 
 Senior Democracy 341 0.645 0.479 0 1 
 Years Democracy 341 47.610 20.966 16 72 
 Regulatory Burden 341 -3.275 0.71 -4.952 -1.901 
 Fiscal Burden 341 42.628 6.717 25.8 59.2 
 Unemployment 341 8.613 4.54 2.25 27.47 
 Openness 341 120.894 66.831 45.609 412.869 
 Education 341 25.395 7.414 9.9 40.4 
 GDPpc_ppp 341 28037  11841        10400  77300 
 
 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity yields p<0.05**, thus allowing us to reject 
homoscedasticity. The average variance inflation factor (VIF) is 3.21 and GDPpc_pppit has an 
individual VIF above six. When we exclude GDPpc_pppit from the model, the average VIF falls 
to 2.35 and all individual VIFs are below four. Results are presented with the sequential 
introduction of variables in the model, so that any effects of potential confounding can be 
observed.  
The Hausman test yields p<0.000, which indicates that a fixed-effect estimation is more 
appropriate. I retain the results of the random-effects GLS estimations, which enables me to 
check the effects of the legal, historical and institutional variables with time-invariant form. 
Next, in the fixed estimations, I replace Senior_Democracy with Years_Democracy, so that the 
effect of the consolidation of democracy can be considered. Note, however, that the inclusion 
of this variable in the random estimations (instead of Senior_Democracy) leaves the results 
unchanged. 
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As mentioned in section 2 above, there are concerns regarding endogeneity in the relationship 
between Regulatory_burden and Corruption_index. To deal with this problem, we use the 
difference-GMM panel data specification developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).3 We include 
as our explanatory variable the lagged dependent variable. Difference-GMM panel data 
estimations rely on a series of lagged variables that are then differenced and used as instruments. 
As such, it is helpful to deal with potential issues of endogeneity. 
Results 
Table 3 shows the results obtained from the random-effects GLS estimations, with time effects. 
From this set of estimations, and within the domain of variables related to government 
intervention, we see that Regulatory_Burden is significantly and positively associated with 
corruption (i.e. the greater the regulatory burden, the greater the perception of corruption). In 
contrast, Fiscal_Burden does not present any relationship with corruption. Both results are in 
accordance with expectations.  
The same is true of all variables capturing economic and social factors: all of them are related 
with the corruption index, but while Unemployment is positively associated to corruption, 
Openness, Education, and GDPpc_ppp present a negative association: i.e. the greater the level 
of foreign competition, educational attainment and economic development, the lower the 
perception of corruption. Note, however, that the Hausman test suggests that the fixed-effect 
estimation is more appropriate for our data base, so we need to return to these variables later. 
 
 
                                                            
3 An alternative way of dealing with endogeneity is to use instrumental variables. However, 
homoscedasticity was rejected with the Breusch-Pagan test, and with heteroscedasticity conventional 
IV estimators are inefficient (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003, p. 1) 
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Table 3. Results from random-effects GLS estimation 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
At this juncture, the most interesting results to emerge from Table 3 are those for the time-
invariant variables that cannot enter subsequent estimations (i.e. fixed-effects and GMM).  In 
this regard, greater experience with democracy, as measured by Senior_Democracy, is 
negatively associated with corruption (i.e. the consolidation of democracy lowers corruption). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Variables Random Random Random  Random Random Random Random 
        
        
Common_Law -0.533 -0.288 -0.246 -0.293 -0.468* -0.122 -0.136 
 (0.511) (0.342) (0.302) (0.275) (0.267) (0.257) (0.261) 
        
German_Law -0.587 -0.403 -0.405* -0.333 -0.370* -0.368** -0.331* 
 (0.381) (0.255) (0.223) (0.203) (0.196) (0.173) (0.178) 
        
Scandinavian_Law -1.409*** -1.1032*** -1.058*** - 0.931*** -1.083*** -0.893*** -0.862*** 
 (0.413) (0.280) (0.255) (0.235) (0.229) (0.210) (0.214) 
        
Colonial_History 0.530*** 0.622 0.633* 0.665** 1.064*** 0.853*** 0.597* 
 (0.596) (0.398) (0.347) (0.315) (0.314) (0.284) (0.315) 
        
Senior_Democracies -1.749***  -1.577*** -1.600*** -1.531*** -1.559*** -1.439*** -1.174*** 
 (0.380) (0.254) (0.228) (0.208) (0.200) (0.180) (0.124) 
        
Regulatory_Burden  0.384*** 0.396*** 0.373*** 0.359*** 0.345*** 0.331*** 
  (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
        
Fiscal_Burden   0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
        
Unemployment    0.027*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.021*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
        
Openness     -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Education      -0.030*** -0.025*** 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
        
GDPpc_ppp       -1.59e-05** 
       (7.50e-06) 
 
Constant -2.650*** -1.658*** -1.813*** -1.900*** -1.271*** -0.866** -0.770* 
 (0.387) (0.291) (0.417) (0.401) (0.407) (0.398) (0.404) 
        
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Number Countries 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Chi2 of Wald Test 97.77*** 224.05*** 265.26*** 326.21*** 375.34 464.91*** 455.75*** 
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The opposite is true of colonial history in Europe after World War II, which presents a positive 
association with corruption. 
Greater attention needs to be given here to the variable(s) related to legal origins and 
administrative traditions. Table 4 presents the results for each legal origin vs. all others and also 
a one-to-one comparison. As hypothesized, Civil Law is positively associated with corruption, 
whereas Scandinavian Law is negatively related to corruption in all comparisons, presenting a 
highly significant coefficient. Results for the comparison made between Common Law and 
German Law indicate no significant difference. Note, however, that German Law appears to 
have a negative (decreasing) effect on corruption when compared to Civil Law, although 
statistical significance in this regard is weak (p<0.10). Interestingly, the statistical significance 
of the comparison between German and French Law increases (from p<0.10 to p<0.01) if we 
shift Netherlands from Civil (as in La Porta et al., 2008) to German Law (as in Painter and 
Peters, 2010a, p. 22). Furthermore, the negative effect of German Law when compared to all 
other regimes considered together becomes (weakly) significant, (p<0.10). All other results 
remain unchanged. 
 
Table 4. Results comparing legal origins (from model 6 in random-effects GLS estimation) 
 All three other Civil Law Common Law German Law Scandinavian Law 
Civil Law 0.424*** 
(0.142) 
- 
 
- - - 
Common Law 0.146 
(0.249) 
-0.136 
(0.261) 
- - - 
German Law -0.133 
(0.168) 
-0.331* 
(0.178) 
-0.195 
(0.296) 
- - 
Scandinavian 
Law 
-0.725*** 
(0.195) 
-0.862*** 
(0.214) 
-0.726*** 
(0.294) 
-0.531** 
(0.236) 
- 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Countries according to Legal Origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). 
Civil Law: Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Malta, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain. 
Common Law: Cyprus, Ireland, United Kingdom. 
German Law: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland. 
Scandinavian Law: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. 
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Turning now to the fixed-effect estimations, Table 5 presents the results, which are generally 
more consistent than those obtained from the random estimation. As discussed, institutional and 
democracy-related time-invariant variables are not included here, but the variable 
Years_Democracy is. This variable is strongly significant, and the greater a country’s 
experience with democracy, the lower the level of corruption. The results for the variables 
related to government intervention are the same as those obtained previously: Regulatory 
Burden is significantly and positively related to corruption, whereas Fiscal Pressure does not 
show any significant relationship with corruption.  
In the case of the economic and social variables, the results present differences to those obtained 
for the random estimations. When unemployment is introduced (estimation 11), it has a 
significant positive association with corruption, while the opposite is the case when introducing 
openness (estimation 12), which is negatively related to corruption. However, education does 
not show a significant association with corruption (estimation 13). Moreover, when we include 
overall economic development (GDPpc_ppp, estimation 14), all the other economic and social 
variables lose significance, whereas the democracy-related and government intervention 
variables remain unchanged in all estimations. Consistent with Treisman (2007), when the 
author considered economic development as a driver of corruption, most of the other economic 
and social variables (in our case unemployment, openness and education) lose significance, 
given that they are strongly related with overall economic development. This is a clear 
indication of the limitations for inferring conclusions from the relationship between partial 
socioeconomic variables and corruption. 
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Table 5. Fixed-effects estimations 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, Table 6 shows the results from the GMM estimations when including a lagged 
dependent variable. Note that Arellano-Bond tests for AR(2) and AR(3), as well as the Hansen 
tests for overidentifying restrictions, always yield p>0.10, suggesting that endogeneity is not a 
relevant concern. In this final set of estimations, Years_Democracy and Regulatory_Burden 
present the same results as in the previous estimations. In the case of Fiscal_ Burden, a few 
estimations show a weakly significant positive association with corruption. This would suggest 
a weak direct association between changes in fiscal burden and corruption. However, the 
relationship is not significant in any of the other estimations, including the most complete, 
preferred estimation (21).    
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Variables Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed 
Years_Democracy -3.170*** -5.189*** -5.227*** -4.915*** -4.645*** -4.680*** -4.812*** 
 (0.730) (0.688) (0.686) (0.694) (0.703) (0.704) 
 
(0.696) 
Regulatory_Burden  0.452*** 0.438*** 0.415*** 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.404*** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
 
(0.051) 
Fiscal_Burden   0.013* 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.010 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
Unemployment    0.014** 0.016** 0.015** 0.005 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
Openness     -0.002** -0.002* -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Education      -0.012 -0.007 
      (0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
GDPpc_ppp       -2.53e-05*** 
(8.70e-06) 
        
Constant 0.704 5.350*** 4.285*** 4.332*** 4.273*** 4.557*** 5.515*** 
 (1.143) (1.142) (1.180) (1.190) (1.184) (1.211) (1.241) 
        
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
Number of Countries 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared within 0.182 0.355 0.361 0.373 0.381 0.384 0.401 
R-squared between 0.633 0.766 0.750 0.764 0.764 0.786 0.799 
R-squared overall 0.610 0.745 0.730 0.744 0.745 0.766 0.778 
F 6.05*** 13.65*** 12.90*** 12.57*** 12.12*** 11.44*** 11.54*** 
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Table 6. Results from GMM estimations 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Variables Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Corruption_index_t-1 -0.275 -0.246 -0.304* -0.344* -0.305* -0.333* -0.374* 
 (0.208) (0.183) (0.176) (0.187) (0.184) (0.182) 
 
(0.201) 
 
Years_Democracy -13.651*** -12.899*** -13.878*** -13.399*** -12.925*** -13.562*** -13.284*** 
 (5.222) (4.321) (4.620) (4.667) (4.472) (4.902) 
 
(4.953) 
 
Regulatory_Burden  0.264*** 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.260*** 0.263*** 
  (0.070) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.071) 
 
(0.073) 
 
Fiscal_Burden   0.014** 0.012* 0.010* 0.011* 0.010 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Unemployment    0.009 0.011 0.009 0.008 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Openness     -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
Education      -0.043*** -0.044*** 
      (0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 
GDPpc_ppp       -7.51e-06 
(1.04e-05) 
        
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
#  Instruments  18 19 20 21 322 23 24 
# Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
# Country  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Chi2 of Wald Test 296.08*** 261.61*** 279.05*** 294.29*** 264.08*** 365.16*** 353.50*** 
AR (1) 2.48** 2.43** 2.69*** 2.75*** 2.60*** 2.66*** 2.56** 
AR (2) 1.44 1.11 1.30 1.03 1.11 1.12 1.10 
AR (3) 1.19 1.29 1.28 1.10 1.21 1.18 1.08 
Hansen Test p-value 0.453 0.560 0.646 0.675 0.665 0.685 0.704 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Unlike in the fixed-effect estimations, the introduction of economic development in the most 
complete estimation (21) shows a lack of association with changes in the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, while unemployment lacks significance throughout the estimations, openness and 
education present the expected result, which can be understood as a significant negative 
relationship between changes in openness and education and changes in corruption. 
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Discussion and policy implications 
Differences in the perception of corruption across the countries of Europe are marked and 
persistent over time. This study has contributed to the literature by providing an explanation of 
the main factors accounting for these divergences in a sample made up of the 28 EU and three 
EFTA countries between 2007 and 2017. Greater experience of democracy is negatively related 
to corruption, while the civil law administrative tradition presents a positive association. These 
results are consistent and significant across all models and estimations. Openness and education 
tend to be negatively associated with corruption, but their association with a country’s overall 
economic development places some limitations on these findings.  
The core hypothesis in this study is that corruption is most dependent on the style of government 
intervention in the economy. Indeed, while fiscal intervention does not appear to have a 
significant influence on corruption, regulatory intervention and the burden associated with 
excessive red tape show a strong and consistent direct association across all models and 
estimations. This is a relevant finding and suggests a fruitful path for interpreting differences 
between European countries and their subsequent policy implications. 
Northern European countries tend to give priority to fiscal intervention and adopt a more 
flexible approach to regulatory intervention and bureaucratic procedures. In contrast, Eastern 
and particularly Southern European countries tend to give greater priority to intervention by 
means of regulation and bureaucratic procedures. This is consistent with the fact that the 
Scandinavian, and to some extent the German, administrative and legal traditions present a 
negative association with corruption, while the opposite is the case of the Civil Law tradition. 
This, together with differences in democratic experience, contribute greatly to explaining 
differences in the perception of corruption across European countries and their persistence.  
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Policy implications directly emerge from this research. If regulatory intervention and 
bureaucratic proceduralism and discretion –that is, drowning the system in red tape– favour 
corruption, reducing over-regulation and eliminating red tape that imposes unjustified and 
excessive compliance burden could help to improve transparency and cut down on the amount 
of corruption.  
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Appendix. 
Table A1 Correlation matrix 
 Civil 
Law 
Com 
Law 
Germ 
Law 
 
Sand 
Law Colon 
Senior 
Demo 
Year 
Demo 
Reg 
Burden 
Fiscal 
Burden 
Unem
p 
Open Educa GDPpc
_ppp 
Civil_Law 1.000             
Common_Law -0.243 1.000            
German_Law -0.589 -0.260 1.000           
Scandinavian_Law -0.325 -0.143 -0.348 1.000          
Colonial_History 0.080 0.358 -0.209 -0.115 1.000         
Senior_Democracy 0.268 0.243 -0.656 0.325 0.195 1.000        
Years_Democracy  0.135 0.241 -0.572 0.389 0.174 0.925 1.000       
Regulatory_Burden 0.337 -0.210 0.133 -0.445 -0.110 -0.332 -0.412 1.000      
Fiscal_Burden -0.020 -0.317 -0.218 0.569 -0.160 0.396 0.443 0.002 1.000     
Unemployment 0.223 0.022 -0.041 -0.254 -0.038 -0.110 -0.293 0.408 -0.144 1.000    
Openness 0.148 0.007 0.025 -0.231 0.325 -0.065 0.048 -0.184 -0.212 -0.184 1.000   
Education -0.153 0.408 -0.347 0.331 -0.001 0.423 0.501 -0.620 0.139 -0.051 0.088 1.000  
GDPpc_ppp 0.063 0.091 -0.334 0.288 -0.086 0.626 0.716 -0.516 0.294 -0.401 0.402 0.544 1.000 
 
 
